The "secularization" and ethnicization of migration discourse: the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return in Finnish politics by Prindiville, N & Hjelm, T
1The ‘Secularisation’ and Ethnicisation of Migration Discourse: The Ingrian Finnish Right to
Return in Finnish Politics
Nicholas Prindiville and Titus Hjelm
(Accepted for Publication in Ethnic and Racial Studies, 27/02/2017)
ABSTRACT
Finland’s Right to Return policy for Ingrian Finns presented Russian and Estonian citizens
that the Finnish government deemed to have an ancestral connection to Finland the legal
means to resettle in Finland. The policy existed from 1990 to 2010, and was initially driven
by Finnish President Mauno Koivisto, who spoke publicly of his belief that the Ingrian Finnish
minority in Russia was Finnish because it was Lutheran rather than Orthodox. However, as
the political discussion on the Ingrian Finns’ identity and Right to Return continued into the
1990s and 2000s, Finnish politicians increasingly abandoned the view of a common Lutheran
identity between Ingrian Finns and Finland, and shifted the discussion to language, ancestry
and historical memory, which were used to both endorse and disendorse Ingrian Finns’
Finnishness. We argue that the disappearance of religion from the Right to Return discourse
was a strategic—if not necessarily conscious—choice that emphasized the more primordial
aspects of Finnish identity (and the Ingrian Finns’ lack of those), which in turn enable stricter
restrictions and, ultimately, the discontinuation of the policy.
In April 1990, Finland’s then-President Mauno Koivisto sat down to a televised interview, part
of which focused on his decision to instruct the Finnish Immigration Service to grant residence
permits to Ingrian Finns as ‘returnee’ migrants.  The Immigration Service defined returnee
migrants as those who can prove ‘Finnish ancestry or otherwise a close connection with
Finland’.1 Koivisto argued that Ingrian Finns met this qualification as the descendants of
Finnish migrants to the historical province of Ingria, nowadays part of north-western Russia
and Estonia.  Hence,  ‘[a]  person from the former Soviet  Union can be granted a  residence
1 Maahanmuuttovirasto, ‘Returnees’. The text has been removed from the Maahanmuuttovirasto
website, but is available from the authors on request.
2permit if the person's nationality is Finnish, i.e. he or she is not a Finnish citizen but is of Finnish
origin in terms of ethnic background’.2
Following Koivisto’s decision, Finnish lawmakers were faced with the problem of how Ingrian
Finns’ “Finnishness” could be identified. Ancestry, cultural identification and other identity
markers like language and religion were all discussed in this context, and specific qualifications
for Ingrian Finns to prove their ethnic Finnish background and/or connection to Finland were
introduced into Finland’s main immigration law, the Aliens Act, in 1991, 1996 and 2002–2003.
These qualifications became increasingly restrictive with each addition, until the Ingrian
Finnish migration queue was closed in 2010.
In this article we examine how Finnish politicians constructed religion as an element of
Finnishness, and how politicians initially used membership of the Lutheran Church in Russia
and Estonia as proof of Ingrian Finns’ Finnishness and thus appropriateness for returnee
migrant status. We also note how religion soon disappeared from the political discourse, and
analyse how ethnicity supplanted religion as an identity marker. Finally, we discuss the
reasons and consequences of this change for the construction of the Ingrian Finns’ Finnish
identity. We argue that instead of the more open nature of religion (church membership is
not limited to a particular group), the essentialist definitions of identity provided a better
strategic resource for MPs arguing against the Right to Return. Thus, the article demonstrates
(a) how discursive constructions of identity can acquire opposite effects depending on the
context of their presentation, and (b) how the content of political identity discourses is less
2 Maahanmuuttovirasto, ‘Persons Coming from the Former Soviet Union’. The text has been removed
from the Maahanmuuttovirasto website, but is available from the authors on request.
3important than the framing of these discourses as primordial characteristics rather than
reflexive capabilities.
The Ingrian Finnish case presents some unique aspects for analysis of migration discourse,
given the particularities of Finland’s migration history. Finland lacks the same post-war history
of immigration as many other western European states, and thus unlike other examples of
European returnee migrants, the political discussion on Ingrian Finns was not focused on
comparisons to other migrant groups. The absence of large migrant communities in Finland
gave space for Finnish politicians to link primodial identity constructions to national identity
without much push-back.
In addition to Koivisto’s April 1990 interview, our empirical material consists of 48
speeches/statements by Finnish MPs and ministers during parliamentary discussions
regarding the drafting and amendment of the Aliens Act and other relevant legislation. Our
focus is on the utterances which refer to the integration capability of the Ingrian Finns. The
choice of excerpted texts in the analysis below reflects this focus. In addition, we examine the
legislation related to the Right to Return policy. We have analysed these using a tailored
version of critical discourse analysis (CDA).
After discussing our theoretical and methodological premises, we provide a brief background
history of Finnish–Ingrian Finnish relations. Second, we examine how religion—Lutheranism
to be precise—became one of the constituting aspects of the Ingrian Finns’ Finnishness. Third,
we show how other aspects of ethnic identity supplanted religion as a frame of reference
when discussing the Ingrian Finns’ integration capability. Fourth, we examine how these
4‘primordial’ ethnic identity markers were later used to argue against the Ingrian Finns’
integration capability. Finally, we suggest reasons for why the described ‘secularisation’ and
ethnicisation happened in the political context of Finland between 1990 and 2010.
National and Ethnic Identity and the Analysis of Political Discourse
The impact of Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1979) has been so extensive that
it seems almost superfluous to assert that national identity is a social construct. Yet it is exactly
this ‘common-senseness’ that invites clarity about one’s position. There are four issues that
we want to discuss in this section, in order to position our theoretical and methodological
approach.
First, although in scholarly discourse ‘identity’ is commonly understood as a product of
processes of social construction (Hjelm 2014), the everyday use of the word has made it a
fuzzy concept. Hence there is sometimes a tendency to reify identity as something essential
to an entity—in this case, ‘the nation’—even in critical accounts. To sensitise ourselves to this,
we take seriously Jean-François Bayart’s suggestion that ‘there is no such thing as identity,
only operational acts of identification’ (2005, 92). This view is echoed in Brubaker and
Cooper’s  (2000)  account  of  identity,  and  like  them  we  want  to  retain  the  concept  while
treating identity as a continuous process and, indeed, struggle.
Second, although there are valid reasons for differentiating between ethnic and national
identity, we use them interchangeably in this article. Our empirical material conflates the two:
5a ‘person's nationality is considered Finnish’ if ‘they are of Finnish origin in terms of ethnic
background’.3 Within our framework the interesting detail is how constructions of national
identity become suffused with what were considered more essential, i.e. ‘ethnic’ qualities.
The conflation between ethnic identity and national identity has several problematic
consequences, chiefly the potential for marginalising those who claim membership of a
nationality but have a different ethnic identity, such as second-generation immigrants. This
presents an interesting dimension to our study, in that political discussions of Ingrian Finnish
exclusion and inclusion in national and ethnic identity become a statement of Finland’s own
national identity and its relationship to ethnic identity, with relevance for other communities
in Finland. It is interesting to note the period of our study (1990-2010) is also a period of
increasing migration diversity in Finland, as communities of African and Middle Eastern decent
became larger and more visible in Finnish cities. The problem of “ethnicising” national identity
therefore has broad consequences for defining belonging in Finland.
Third, as Wodak et al. (1999), Mole (2007), and others demonstrate, discourse analysis in its
various forms is perfectly suited to examine the processes of identification mentioned above.
Hjelm (2014, 6) argues that discourse theory and its operationalisations fit a dynamic view of
identity construction particularly well because of the ‘action orientation’ of discourse. That is,
discourse analysis is not only interested in what is being said, but more importantly how things
are done with discourse. Wodak et al. (1999, 8) argue that in the context of national identity,
discourse analysis can ‘throw light on the largely contingent and imaginary character of nation
and … sharpen awareness of dogmatic, essentialist and naturalising conceptions of nation and
national identity’.
3 Maahanmuuttovirasto, ‘Persons Coming from the Former Soviet Union’.
6Finally, building on the theoretical base of identity as construction/identification, and
theorisations of discourse, our methodological approach draws from Critical Discourse
Analysis (CDA), broadly understood. While subscribing to the basic constructionist tenets
discussed above, CDA provides a toolkit that can be shaped in many ways with a variety of
foci. Our apparatus concentrates on the analysis of meaning instead of a more-fine-grained
linguistic analysis. This is done by focusing on meaningful packages of claims and articulations
and their contextualisations within party politics and the broader social context. Through an
analysis of meaning-construction we identify (implying an active process of construction)
different discourses, or ways of talking, which ‘designate both the relevant area of knowledge,
and the particular way it is constructed’ (Fairclough 1992, 128). In addition, when relevant we
look at the rhetorical aspects of the parliamentary discourse, that is, how a particular type of
discourse is  made persuasive.  Finally,  on the level  of  grammar,  we examine lexis,  or  word
choice, which is particularly important when it creates a sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Richardson
2007).
Our discourse analytical focus differs from most CDA-influenced analyses in the important
sense that while CDA often focuses on the ideological suppression of alternative discourses in
favour  of  one  hegemonic  discourse  (Fairclough  1992),  our  aim  is  to  look  at  the  variety  of
discourses offered as descriptions of Finnishness. We are, however, no less concerned with
‘meaning in the service of power’ (Thompson 1990, 8) than analysts focusing on discursive
hegemony. Discursive variety is not an indicator of unideological discourse in itself. First, as
we point out below, discourses can stay the same, but they acquire new meanings in different
contexts. Power manifests itself in the ways in which discourse is strategically put to use in
changing contexts. Second, we retain CDA’s interest in examining what is not said. The
7absence of a discourse—especially when it is based on a tacit understanding of a taken-for-
granted ‘fact’—can also be considered ‘substantially, though not entirely, ideological’
(Fairclough, 1989: 84). Within our focus on the level of meaning, looking at absences denotes
the macro-level disappearance of religion as a topic altogether. As we argue in the conclusion,
this can be interpreted as an ideological choice.
Ingria, the Ingrian Finns, and Finland
Finnish politicians’ discussions on the Ingrian Finnish Return law are informed by a history
stretching back at least 400 years. In 1617, Sweden—including present-day Finland—annexed
territory along the easternmost coast of the Gulf of Finland, which became a focal area for
immigration by Finnish-speaking peoples, who would become the dominant ethno-linguistic
group in the region. These settlers, and their descendants, have become known as the Ingrian
Finns. As a result of Russian conquest during the Great Northern War (1700-1721) Ingria was
politically cut off from the Finnish peninsula. The Russians conquered the rest of the Finnish
peninsula in 1809 and established the Autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland, but Ingria’s
position as the focal point of Peter the Great’s Westernisation movement and location of his
new capital ensured it never formed part of the Grand Duchy and was governed wholly by
Russian authorities.
Ingrian Finns were an ethnic minority population within Russian territory, and thus subject to
Russian law and not the semi-autonomous legal system of the Grand Duchy of Finland.
Although Finnish-language elementary schools were abolished by the Tsar in 1908, Finnish-
language religious instruction continued in the Ingrian Finnish parishes (Duke 2008). such that
8Ingrian Finnish self-identification as linguistically and religiously connected to the Grand
Duchy was maintained up until Finnish independence in 1917 (Ylönen 1998).
Active crossing of boundaries continued after Finnish independence - Pirkko Malinen argues
the arrival of Ingrian Finns in Finland in the early 1990s was the “third wave of Ingrian-Finnish
migration to Finland” (1999, 195). The first wave arrived after the Russian Revolution, when
Ingrian Finns lost much of their cultural and linguistic autonomy in the new Soviet Union. The
second wave refers to the 63,000 Ingrian Finns evacuated to Finland during the Siege of
Leningrad in World War II, and the 55,000 who supposedly voluntarily returned at the end of
the War to the Soviet Union. Recent investigations by the Finnish National Archive suggest the
Soviet Union and Allies may have exerted pressure on the Finnish government to forcibly
repatriate them. In the Soviet Union, the many Ingrian Finns who were deported from Ingria
to distant provinces were punished for their perceived Finnishness. Those who had joined or
cooperated with the Finnish army faced forced labour sentences, or more rarely, execution
(Westerlund 2008, 14–16).
It is against this complex background that Ingrian Finns returned to Finnish political discourse
in a completely changed situation in international politics in the 1990s. In this situation the
history between the Finns and the Ingrian Finns became not just the context but a topic of
contention through which the Ingrian Finns’ Finnishness was produced.  We now turn to these
discourses.
In the Beginning: The Ingrian Finns as Lutherans
9Finnish politics has a history of constructing Ingrian Finns’ links to Finland through religion.
Lutheranism defined Ingrian Finns’ otherness from the surrounding Russian or Soviet
population, and drove some early political discussions of Finland’s duty to protect its ‘ethnic
kin’. In the early years of the Soviet Union, the Ingrian irredentist movement captured the
imagination of Finnish nationalists in Finland, spurring Finnish volunteer brigades to join the
chaos  of  the  Russian  Civil  War  under  the  pretext  of  ‘rescuing  Ingria  from  the  yoke  of
Bolshevism’ (Nevalainen 1992, 240-1). Paasi describes 1920s Finnish depictions of the Soviet
Union as ‘the eternal hereditary enemy of Finland, and as a Bolshevist bastion that posed a
threat to Western civilisation and Christianity’ (1990, 58)—a view that remained strong
especially in the imagination of the Far Right until World War II (Koskelainen and Hjelm 2016).
Finnish Lutheranism served, therefore, a dual function: On the one hand, it was a constitutive
element of identity to be defended against the secularising forces of Bolshevism in Ingria. On
the other hand, it linked Ingrian Finns and Finns of Finland as part of a broader Western
identity distinct from surrounding Russians—atheist Bolshevik and Orthodox alike.
Some 70 years later, President Mauno Koivisto would also use religion to link Ingrian Finns to
Finland and differentiate them from their Russian surroundings. On the 10 April 1990 episode
of the Finnish talk show Ajankohtainen kakkonen.  Koivisto was asked: ‘Is public opinion, or
has it been, influencing the fact that Finland has now decided to take in Ingrians to the
country?’—which in itself suggests that the Finnish public has an affinity with the Ingrian
Finns. Koivisto responded:
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Perhaps it has had some influence. In any case, it’s about the fact that these are Finns,
who by Swedish decree at the time were transferred to the area, and for example in
religion are very strongly Lutheran rather than Orthodox, so yes they are suitable for
these Right to Return criteria, although they have lived there [in Ingria] for a long time.
A key element of Koivisto’s discursive strategy is how he uses Ingrian Finnish Lutheranism as
a matter-of-fact indicator of Ingrian Finns’ Finnish identity. Their ‘strong’ Lutheranism is
juxtaposed with Orthodoxy as a means of differentiation from the Russian majority in the
region, rather than the perceived Bolshevism of Russians in Finnish political discourse of the
1920s. It is significant that Koivisto equates Finns and Ingrian Finns uniquely through religion
– there is no mention of their common language, and only a very vague indication of their
common history. At this point in Finnish politics, at least, Lutheranism appeared to hold the
most prominent position in the discourse on Ingrian Finns’ Finnish identity.
After Koivisto, mentions of Ingrian Finnish Lutheran identity appear in discussions of use of
Lutheran Church membership in Ingria as means of proving Finnishness. The 1991 Aliens Act,
as the key legal immigration document of this time, included provisions for return migrants
designed for Ingrian Finnish migrants in section 18: ‘A temporary residence permit may be
granted  if  a  close  relative  of  the  alien  resides  in  Finland  or  if  the  alien  has  other  ties  to
Finland’.4 In a debate on the parliament floor, Social Democrat politician Raimo Vuoristo noted
in 1993 that the Finnish Immigration Service was accepting certificates of membership in the
Ingrian Lutheran Church as proof of ‘other ties to Finland’ for granting of residency permits.5
4 “Ulkomaalaislaki”, available online at URL: <http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/1991/19910378> ,
accessed 4 November 2016.
5 Raimo Vuoristo, “Suomen kansalaisuuden myöntämisestä inkeriläisille paluumuuttajille”, KK
483/1993. .
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Finnish political discourse at this time thus accepted Ingrian Finns as Finns through a common
Lutheran identity, indicative of religion’s significance in creating an argument for Ingrian
Finnish inclusion in Finland.
The Disappearance of Religion and the Ethnicisation of the Ingrian Finns
In the years immediately following Koivisto’s statement on Ingrian Finns, Finnish politicians
did not discuss, dispute or consider the significance of Ingrian Finns’ and Finns’ common
Lutheranism in their discussion on return migration. Instead, the political discourse came to
be dominated by discussions on language, ancestry and collective memory as discursive
resources for the construction of common Ingrian Finnish and Finnish history. We argue that
the political discourse on Ingrian Finns in Finland thus transformed relatively quickly to a
discussion on ethnic identity rather than religious identity to prove links between Ingrian Finns
and Finnishness.
Language
Language is a key component in the construction of national identity, as many commentators
have argued (e.g. Hobsbawn 1996; Smith 1999). Fewster (2006) argues that nineteenth and
early twentieth century Finnish nation building was primarily driven by language as a unifying
concept. So it was with the Ingrian Finns, although Finnish politicians’ statements exhibit a
rather divided view on the matter. On the one hand, Finnish language is considered a sign of
Finnishness, even if the cultural differences between The Soviet Union and Finland were
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considered significant. In September 1990, a group of parliamentarians from the centre-right
National Coalition Party expressed concern to the government at how prepared Ingrian
Finnish returnee migrants were for life in Finland:
Ingrian Finns who move to Finland come to a country that is strange and alien to them,
and  they  must  start  their  lives  from  scratch  here.   While  the  first  stages  of  their
migration here have revealed some degree of competence in the Finnish language,
and a better education than the average, their knowledge of Finnish society is very
incomplete.6
By October 1990, there were approximately 1,500 Ingrian Finnish returnee migrants in
Finland.7 Minister for Social, Alcohol and Gender Affairs Tuulikki Hämäläinen (Social
Democrat)  predicted at  the time that  time that  up to  10,000 would arrive  in  the next  few
years.8 Language capability now featured as an independent factor that could be a sign of the
Ingrian Finns’ Finnishness but, on the other hand, an obstacle to integration. As Ingrian Finns
began to arrive in Finland in bigger numbers, concerns regarding the limits of the Ingrians’
rapid integration capability began to emerge. The then-Minister of Labour, Ilkka Kanerva,
(National Coalition Party), echoed these concerns in December 1991 with an emphasis on the
problem of language, noting that “only some of the Soviet Finns and Estonian Ingrians can
adequately speak the Finnish language. This presents the Finnish reception system with new
challenges”.9  The integration of Ingrian Finns in Finland was thus swiftly being viewed in terms
6 Lea Kärhä, Riita Uosukainen, Tapio Holvitie, Martti Tiuri, Anna-Kaarina Luovo, Kristi Ala-Harja, Riitta
Juoppila and Kalevi Lamminen, “Määrärahan osoittamisesta Inkeri-asiamiehen viran perustamiseen”,
RA 2063/1990. .
7 Ibid.
8 Tuulikki Hämäläinen, “Vastaus”, KK 539/1990,.
9 Ibid.
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of their Finnish language abilities, and this was taken up by the centre-right in Finnish politics,
for whom the economic implications of migration, and the question of labour market
integration for Ingrian Finns, was of particular concern.
It is particularly noteworthy that the initial concern from the National Coalition Party noted
“some degree of competence in the Finnish language”, which suggests a differentiation
between those who speak Finnish as a mother tongue and those who speak it as a second or
learned language. Indeed, Kanerva describes those Ingrian Finns who do speak Finnish as
having “adequate” language skills, again suggesting non-native or non-first language
knowledge, which differentiates Ingrian Finns from the bulk of Finland’s population. The
discourse on integration capability was therefore in part a discussion on whether, in assuming
Ingrian Finns had a connection to Finnishness that made them eligible as returnee migrants,
it was overlooked that many Ingrian Finns lacked a specific connection to Finland through a
common mother tongue. In this way, language could therefore function in this discourse as a
primordial identity resource that comments on Ingrian Finns’ ethnic background and
construction as Finns.
Ancestry
Ancestral connection was another important aspect in the political discourse on links between
Ingrian Finns and Finland, again taken up by the centre-right, with a more conservative
approach to immigration. National Coalition Party parliamentarians argued in October 1990
that despite the many integration challenges facing Ingrian Finnish returnee migrants, they
14
continued to arrive in Finland drawn by “of course, an interest in their Finnish lineage”.10 This
discourse on Ingrian Finns is predicated on the notion of a primordialist identity link to Finland,
and the idea that Ingrian Finns were connected to Finnishness as a community of common
blood. Although potential weaknesses in Ingrian Finnish conformity to Finnish politicians’
understanding of Finnishness, particularly on language, were acknowledged and discussed,
implementation of the policy progressed on the assumption that Ingrian Finns were linked to
Finnishness through common ancestry, which would facilitate and motivate better integration
in Finland even if there was initial need for language training. In the discussion on integration
capability in the early years of the Ingrian Finnish return migration, there was not yet any
substantial rejection of the ideology of Ingrian Finnish inclusion in Finnishness by Finnish
politicians, and ancestry thus functions well as a primordial identity resource in political
discourse, used to construct connections between Ingrian Finns and Finnishness.
Collective Memory
Discussions on Ingrian Finnish identity and Ingrian Finns’ primordial link to Finnishness in the
early years of the Ingrian Finnish return migration also make particularly extensive use of
collective memory identity resources. For populist Finnish politicians in the early 1990s, who
targeted ageing World  War II  veterans  as  potential  supporters,  collective  memories  of  the
Winter and Continuation Wars presented particularly resonant means for political language.
A particularly notable instance is provided by Finnish Rural Party (SMP) parliamentarian Tina
10 Maunu Kohijoki, Martti Korkia-Aho and Päivi Varpasuo, “Inkeriläisiä paluumuuttajia palvelevan
Inkerikeskuksen perustamisesta”, KK 539/1990.
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Mäkelä, who in May 1990 submitted a question to the Minister for Health and Social Services
on Ingrian Finns’ war pensions, stating:
During the most recent wars, a number of Ingrian Finns fought in the Finnish
Army. After the war, and the deportation of Ingrian Finns, they were almost all
forced to return to the Soviet Union where they have often lived in difficult
circumstances for much of the time since then. Some of them have suffered
particularly from the fact that they defended Finland with a gun in hand.11
This extract relies on Finnish experiences of World War II to essentially construct an idea of
Finnish identity as defined by a history of struggles with Russians and uses emotional language
to make connections between Ingrian Finns and Finnishness. Not only does Mäkelä’s
presentation of Ingrian Finnish history suggest that the Soviets, like the Finns, see Ingrian Finns
as Finnish, it also draws on Ingrian Finns’ experience of suffering for their Finnishness in the
post-war Soviet Union as an imperative to now provide Ingrian Finns with Finnish residency.
Finnishness is thus “proved” by a shared collective memory of struggling against the USSR.
Anni Kangas (2011) identifies three voices in the Finnish discourse on Finno-Russian relations:
primordialists who see Russia as Finland’s constant enemy, instrumentalists who see the
relationship and its use of history as constructed to serve political ends, and the identity-based
school that focuses criticism on the distinctions made between Finns and Russians. The
discussion on Ingrian Finns, as evidenced in Mäkelä’s comment, shows a distinct presence of
11 Tina Mäkelä  “Rintamapalvelustunnuksen myöntämisestä sotiin osallistuneille inkeriläisille”, KK
330/1990.
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primordialist constructions of Russia/the Soviet Union, focusing in particular on Russian
actions towards Ingrian Finnish refugees during and after World War II. Indeed, a 1993 written
question from Mäkelä’s fellow SMP parliamentarian Marita Jurva (later Mäkinen) to then-
Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen provides further evidence of this:
Ingrians of Finnish kin have for centuries experienced terrible human suffering, not
least after the return of 55,000 Ingrian Finns to the Soviet Union under Article 10 of
the 1944 Armistice Agreement. In the USSR, they were victims of the Stalinist policy
of genocide.12
Use of the term “genocide” to describe the Stalinist retributions against Ingrian Finns after
World War II is a particularly evocative anti-Soviet discourse. The “genocidal” relationship
between Soviets and Ingrian Finns contrasts sharply to the immediately preceding “kin”
relationship between Ingrian Finns and Finns.
Following on from Jurva’s statement, a large group of National Coalition Party
parliamentarians also submitted a written question on Ingrian history to Minister Väyrynen in
1992:
In Russia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, and in some other parts of the former Soviet Union,
there now live about 67,700 Ingrian Finns. This much remains from the 200,000
12 Marita Jurva, “Inkerin virkoaminen -nimisen kansanliikkeen avustamisesta”, KK 68/1993.
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people who lived in Ingria previously for centuries. In Stalin's time, Ingrian Finns began
to be persecuted and moved away from their former dwelling places. Cultural rights
were taken away, the Finnish language was banned, the churches were closed. Ingrian
Finns were exiled to Siberia even before World War II, and tens of thousands of them
were executed. Since 1955, Ingrian Finns have had the opportunity to return to Ingria,
but the internal passport requirement (since 1959) is still preventing many from
returning to their home.13
The use of a comparative population count to show the dramatic reduction in Ingrian Finns’
numbers post-World War II is a complimentary discursive method for evoking the idea of a
Soviet/Russian genocide of Ingrian Finns. This extract also mentions those Ingrian Finns
deported under Stalin from Ingria to remote Siberia and Kazakhstan, as further example of
the suffering Russians inflicted on Ingrian Finns. The mention of the problems with Ingrian
Finns returning to Ingria with their internal passports also gives the impression that Ingrian
Finns are potentially still unsafe in Russia. The use of collective memory of conflict with Russia
as a discursive resource was thus another way in which primordial concepts of Finnish identity
(in  this  case,  Russia/the  Soviet  Union  as  Finns’  eternal  enemy)  became  key  to  the  Finnish
political discourse’s understanding of Ingrian Finnish identity. This was particularly pertinent
for conservative factions in Finnish politics that have associated Russianness with the Soviet
Union and communist ideology (Paasi 1990, 58). The National Coalition Party was effectively
blocked from participating in coalition governments from 1966 to 1987 over concerns that the
Soviet Union would be provoked by a right-leaning government (Aylott, Blomgren and
13 Jouni J. Särkijärvi, Riitta Jouppila, Riitta Saastamoinen, Anneli Taina, Tuula Linnainmaa, Päivi
Varpasuo, Anssi Rauramo, Eeva Turunen, Sauli Niinistö, Irmeli Takala, Kimmo Sasi, Ben Zyskowicz,
Leila Lehtinen, Väinö Saario and Oiva Savela, “Inkeriläisten auttamista koskevan
kokonaissuunnitelman laatimisesta”, KK 71/1992.
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Bergman 2013, 90), which may account for why negative presentations of Russianness in
relation to Ingrian Finns were articulated primarily by members of that party.
Ethnicisation and its Discontents
We argue that analysis of the changing discussions on the Ingrian Finnish Return policy after
the mid 1990s suggests Finnish political decision makers re-evaluated Ingrian Finns’ Finnish
identity, but not the nature of Finnish identity itself. We see language capabilities as playing
a major part in the discussion on limitations to Ingrian Finns’ Finnishness over this period,
reflecting the symbolic weight the Finnish language holds as a cornerstone of Finnish identity,
even in an officially bilingual (Finnish/Swedish) nation. We further argue that Finnish
politicians also questioned the validity of Ingrian Finns’ ancestral connection to Finland, as
regulations were introduced in 1996 that sought to restrict ancestral descent to within living
memory (two generations, along the lines of a ‘grandmother clause’) rather than less-readily
proven connections potentially spanning many centuries. This indicates some degree of
challenge to the construction of Finnishness as purely a community of descent, which had
been used as a discursive resource to link Finns and Ingrians to a common identity in the early
1990s. Now, Ingrian Finns would increasingly be portrayed as fundamentally separate from
the mainstream of Finnish identity, which continued to be defined to varying extents through
other core discursive resources – Finnish language, ancestry, and collective memory,
particularly from World War II. In effect, the same markers of identity Finnish politicians
employed to argue for Ingrian Finns’ Finnishness were now being used to argue for their un-
Finnishness.
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Interestingly, there is no mention of Ingrian Finns’ religious connection to Finland after the
mid 1990s. Götz (2003) cites Lutheranism as a key structure of Nordic identity construction,
so its absence in the political discussion on Ingrian Finns’ connection to Finland (and the wider
Nordic region) gives some indication of a decline in the importance of religion in defining
Finnishness. The fact that the 1990s saw some indication of Ingrian Finns reconnecting to
Lutheranism, such as the restoration of Kupansita church in 1991, adds further resonance to
the decline of religious in the political discussion, suggesting that Lutheranism by itself was
not held as a sufficiently strong indicator of Finnishness as Finland itself became more secular
in the 1990s and 2000s.
Language
As Ingrian Finnish migrants began to settle in greater numbers in Finland, Finnish politicians
increasingly expressed their concern that Ingrian Finns did not show the expected (and
required) Finnish language skills to be included in the pervasive concept of Finnishness. One
such instance is a 1998 question to the government from a quartet of National Coalition Party
parliamentarians, who wrote:
Today, however, only about a fifth of Ingrian returnees coming to Finland can speak
Finnish, and for many the connection to Finland is actually very weak. Their ability to
gain employment in Finland is also very poor. This situation has led to Finland likely
gaining an unemployed and monolingual Russian minority that is threatened with
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deep social exclusion. There is already alarming news of Ingrian youths spiralling into
drugs and related crimes.14
It is significant to note the clear and definite classification of Ingrian Finns as a monolingual
Russian minority, and the way in which lack of Finnish language abilities is here directly and
immediately  translated  to  a  “very  weak”  connection  to  Finland.  As  had  been  relatively
common in the earlier Finnish political discussions on Ingrian Finns, the politicians’ language
appeals to some degree of sympathy for Ingrian Finns, but in a rather new way. Ingrian Finns
are now seen as a vulnerable outsider minority in Finland, rather than in Russia. Failed
integration capability, born of Ingrian Finns’ apparent lack of “Finnishness” by not speaking
the Finnish language, has been deleterious for Ingrian Finns, and necessitates a re-
examination of the Right to Return policy.
The decline in Finnish lawmakers’ faith in Ingrian integration capability becomes more
specifically linked to language with the 2002-2003 amendments to the Right to Return clause
in the Aliens Act. The third point of the first section of amendments states that applicants may
be granted Right to Return status on the following basis:
if the applicant himself/herself, one of his/her parents, or at least two of his/her four
grandparents is or has been documented as of Finnish nationality, and the applicant
has sufficient knowledge of Finnish or Swedish.15
14 Kimmo Sasi, Ilkka Kanerva, Ben Zyskowicz and Suvi Lindén, ’Inkeriläisten
maahanmuuttoedellytykset’, KVN 43/1998.
15 “Laki ulkomaalaislain muuttamisesta”, available online at URL:
<http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2003/20030218>, accessed 15 November 2016.
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This section, taking a previous 1996 amendment on generational ties to Finland, thus further
adds language capability into its restrictions. The importance of integration into Finnish
society through one of Finland’s national languages, implied in the previous amendments, is
now specifically stated and legally codified. This is a significant departure from previous
discussions assuming Finnish-language competence from Ingrian Finns based on their Finnish
heritage.
The amendment of 2002-2003 further notes that the issuing of a Right to Return residence
permit is conditional on three points, the second of which states:
as referred to in paragraph one, subparagraph 3 of the amended law, applicants must
participate in an organised returnee orientation program in their country of origin and
complete a language exam organised by the Finnish authorities to show sufficient
knowledge of Finnish or Swedish at the skill level of A2 in the European Union’s
Common European Framework language proficiency rating scale, unless
circumstances prevent the returnee orientation program or language test from
reasonably being completed.
Thus the minimum requirements for language capability were specifically set, and proof was
now required before the returnee moves to Finland. The A2 skill level indicated by the
amendment is not particularly advanced, suggesting perhaps more a nominal demonstration
of willingness or commitment to learn one of Finland’s national languages prior to
22
immigration. Neither the Parliamentary Committee set up to draft this legislation in October
2002, nor the commissioned opinion of the Eduskunta’s Constitutional Law Committee, offer
any justification or reasoning for the introduction of such language restrictions, beyond
stating that the restrictions do not violate the right of those of Finnish origin to return to
Finland, and that returnee residence permits should be considered different from other
residence permits granted to non-returnee immigrants
Ancestry
The first amendment to the Right to Return law, introduced in 1996, specifically addressed to
return migrants from the former Soviet Union, provides a residence permit for migrants on
the following conditions:
1) if the applicant himself/herself, or his/her parents, or at least two out of four
grandparents, has been noted in his/her documents as a Finnish national, or
2) if the applicant has other evidence of other cohesive connections to Finland and
Finnishness, but he/she does not possess documentation to qualify under
paragraph 1.16
The new amendments appear to bring the criteria for Ingrian Finns closer to the standard of
other returnee groups, with the particular limitation on generational connection to Finland at
16 “Laki ulkomaalaislain muuttamisesta”, available online at URL:
<http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/1996/19960511>, accessed 15 November 2016.
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least serving to bring Ingrian Finnish ancestral connection to Finnish citizenship to within living
memory. Thus, the construction of Finland as a national community of ancestral descent
appears to show some signs of limitation: the Finnishness inherent in ancestry appears to
expire or diminish after many generations living outside the Finnish nation state and Finnish
national community. Yet the language of this amendment is noticeably vague. There is no
definite requirement that one grandparent hold or have held Finnish citizenship. Rather, the
grandparent should have proof of a “cohesive connection to Finland and Finnishness”. The
exact  nature  of  such  a  connection,  and  what  form  the  proof  of  it  should  take,  is  left
unspecified. The assumption present in the earlier discussions that even non-Finnish speaking
Ingrians possess greater integration capability than other migrants through their ancient
ancestral connection to Finland is not completely diminished, but is very much weakened.
Collective Memory
In 1998, National Coalition Party politicians Kimmo Sasi, Ilkka Kanerva, Ben Zyskowicz and Suvi
Lindén stated to the government that “initially Ingrian Finnish migration permission was right
in taking into view Ingrian Finns’ perceived historical wrongs”.17 Funding for Ingrian Finnish
veterans was requested, for instance, by then-Christian League18 parliamentarian Bjarne Kallis
from 2000 to 2009, in budget initiatives to the Eduskunta that called for increased funding to
the Ingrian Finnish and Karelian veterans associations.19 Likewise, in 2002, Christian Democrat
parliamentarian Leea Hiltunen expressed her support for the new stricter language
17 Sasi, Kanerva, Zyskowicz and Lindén, “Inkeriläisten maahanmuuttoedelly tyksistä”, KVN 43/1998.
18 Suomen Kristillinen Liitto, Finnish Christian League, which became Kristillisdemokraatit, the
Christian Democrats, in 2001.
19 Bjarne Kallis, “Määrärahan osoittaminen Inkeriläisten ja karjalaisten heimoveteraanien yhdistys
r.y.:lle”, TAA 418/2000 and TAA 200/2009.
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restrictions for returnee immigrants, and approved of the fact that the new restrictions would
not affect the return of Ingrian Finnish Winter and Continuation War veterans and deported
refugees, as she wrote in a September 2002 question:
It is also fair that these conditions do not apply to those who were part of the
Ingrian Finnish deportations of 1943-1944, or those who served during the
Second World War in the Finnish army.20
Indeed, the 2002-2003 amendments to the Right to Return law, entering into force in 2003,
begin by specifically stating that returnee status may be granted on these conditions:
1) if the applicant belonged to the Ingrian Finnish emigrants who between
1943  and  1944  were  transferred  to  Finland  and  then  after  the  War
returned to the Soviet Union
2) if the applicant has served in the Finnish Army between 1939 and 1945.21
The notion of shared collective memory between Finnish views of World War II and Ingrian
Finnish wartime suffering appears to retain a lasting importance in the Ingrian Finnish Return
discourse, and remained a key focus of Finnish legislation on the issue in the late 1990s and
2000s.
20 Leea Hiltunen, “Maahanmuuttokriteerit täyttävien inkeriläisten maahanmuuttohakemusten
käsittelyn nopeuttaminen”, KK 788/2002.
21 “Laki ulkomaalaislain muuttamisesta”.
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By 2010, when the end of return migration for Ingrian Finns had been announced, the
amendment to the Aliens Act actually retained residence permission for two groups specified
in the 2002-2003 amendment: the Ingrian Finns transferred to the USSR in 1943-1944, and
those who had served in the Finnish Army between 1939 and 1945.22 The discussion on
historical atonement, though now more narrowly defined, thus trumped all others in relating
the Ingrian Finnish Return to constructions of Finnish identity based on the significance of the
discursive resource of struggle against Russia. The dominance of this discourse, which deems
the Winter and Continuation Wars to be wars of survival, appears to have weathered the
challenges of academic reassessments of Second World War history and Finnish culpability
(Holmila 2012; Meinander 2006; Sana 2003; Raivo 2000; Paasi 1996; Suominen 1979).
However, despite the ongoing significance afforded to collective memory in Finnish
politicians’ views of Ingrian Finns, it is significant to note the extent to which populist
politicians in Finland, for whose ideology World War II history holds particular significance,
began to view Ingrian Finns as Russian. The most significant populist figure to comment on
Ingrian Finns’ apparent Russianness is SMP MP Sulo Aittoniemi, whose views represent the
most  overt  linkage of  Ingrian Finns  to  negative  perceptions  of  Russia.  In  September 1996,
Aittoniemi stated:
In recent years, as many as 20,000 so-called Ingrian Finns have moved from Russia to
Finland. The decision to allow and promote the return at this scale was a bad error.
22 “Laki ulkomaalaislain 48 §:n muuttamisesta”, EV 220/2010.
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Ingrian Finns have not found what they came looking for in Finland, and many
desperately long to return to their former homes, if the conditions would at least be
tolerable. Their wishes are to both Finland and Ingrian Finns’ advantage.  23
Reference to Ingrians as “so-called Ingrian Finns” directly challenges previous assertions that
Ingrians belong within the Finnish national community. Thus the suggestion shifts from
bringing Ingrians to Finland under the Right to Return policy, to assisting homesick émigrés in
repatriation to Russia. Whilst the new discussions on the humanitarian imperative to assist
Ingrians in Russia rather than bring them to Finland is very much present in Aittoniemi’s
initiative here, the presentation of Russia as the Ingrian homeland is also significant, depicted
here as the Ingrians’ longed-for home that was left for purely economic reasons, rather than
any sense of threat or being driven out, nor of any emotional connection to Finland.
Aittoniemi’s presentation of the Ingrian Finns reveals an ongoing negative discourse on Russia
and Russians, but one which paints Ingrian Finns as influenced by, or connected to, negative
stereotypes of late 1990s and 2000s Russian behaviour. In a 1997 written question to the
Interior Minister Jan-Erik Enestam, Aittoniemi writes:
The Right to Return mission has later been judged a clear failure. Among other things,
it has attracted only elderly Ingrians who are no longer rooted in Finland. They are
knocking their walking sticks against the asphalt, crying and craving to go back to their
23 Sulo Aittoniemi, “Määrärahan osoittamisesta Venäjälle palaamaan halukkaiden inkerinsuomalaisten
elinolosuhteiden parantamiseen”, TAA 56/1996. .
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old homes. On the other hand, for many of these returnees willing to move here, there
is the possibility of abusing the Right to Return without justification. Some pursue
criminal activity, for instance trafficking. Very few have adapted to the labour
market.24
This statement continues the notion that Ingria, rather than Finland, is the traditional Ingrian
Finnish homeland, as well as the overriding economic and labour market concerns with
increased migration at this time. However, Aittoniemi also plays into pervasive turn-of-the-
millennium perceptions of Russian criminality in Finland. Helsingin Sanomat similarly ran
articles concerning Russian mafia infiltration into Finland, with particular reference to
trafficking of prostitutes from Estonia to Helsinki’s western Lauttasaari district,25 and the rise
of the Estonian-Russian prostitution ring in Helsinki organised by the mafia organisation
“Obtshak” (Russian for “Common Wealth”).26 Aittoniemi’s statement also specifically notes
criminal trafficking activity as an issue for Ingrian Finns. He was even more specific in his
accusations in a November 1997 question to parliament, accusing Inkerin-Liitto, the Ingrian
community’s cultural organisation collaborating with the Finnish Consulate-General in St
Petersburg in processing Right to Return applicants, of being a KGB infiltration front, and both
the Inkerin-Liitto chairman Eero Pellinen and St Petersburg Consul-General Ludmila Zaturina
of being KGB double agents.27 His distrust of Inkerin-Liitto appears born of his belief that “NGO
activities for instance in Russia are in no way comparable to those of Finnish organisations”,
thus suggesting that Inkerin-Liitto is an organisation of Russians, rather than Finns. Aittoniemi
24 Sulo Aittoniemi, “Inkerinsuomalaisten maahanmuutosta”, KK 877/1997.
25 Ari Lahdenmäki and Riku Rantala, “Russian Mafia Ships Prostitutes to Helsinki”, Helsingin Sanomat –
International Edition, 19 June 2001.
26 Jukka Harju, “Osa Suomenkin huumekaupoista päätetään Viron yhteiskassassa”, Helsingin Sanomat,
24 April 2002.
27 Sulo Aittoniemi, “Inkeriläisten paluumuuttoon liittyvien perusteiden selvittämisestä”, KK
1108/1997.
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again questioned the Finnishness of Ingrian Finns in a 2002 statement, claiming that “a large
part of the Ingrian Finns coming to Finland do not have any roots in Finnishness”.28 The
negative assessment of Russians therefore extends here to Ingrian Finns, and hence, Ingrian
Finns are presented now as Russians, or at least more connected to Russia than Finland.
Conclusions
Above we have shown that the political discussion on Ingrian Finnish return migration in
Finland became increasingly doubtful of Ingrian Finns’ connections to Finland, with the
growing argument that Ingrian Finns were not integrating into the Finnish mainstream in the
straightforward way that had been anticipated. At the start of Ingrian Finnish return
migration, Finnish politicians used several identity resources to show the common identity
between Ingrian Finns and Finns of Finland. They were Lutherans, like the bulk of Finland’s
population, spoke the Finnish language, had common ancestral links to Finland, and like Finns
of Finland had the historical experience of struggling against Russia/the USSR to maintain their
independent identity. However, once Ingrian Finns began arriving in Finland, Finnish
politicians began reversing their arguments on most of these identity markers, noting that few
Ingrian Finns actually spoke Finnish, their ancestral connections were too distant to be
meaningful, and the identity distinction between Ingrian Finns and Russians was actually less
distinct than previously thought.
28 Sulo Aittoniemi, “Määrärahan osoittaminen inkerinsuomalaisten elinolojen kohentamiseen heidän
synnyinseuduillaan”, TAA 415/2002.
29
Religion and its links to national identity continues to feature in European migration policy –
a  recent  example  is  the  2015  decision  of  Spain  and  Portugal  to  grant  passports  to  the
descendants of Sephardic Jews expelled in the 15th century. This case extends the gap
between emigration and return centuries further than even the 17th century  migration  of
Ingrian Finns to Ingria. However, religion in the discussion on Ingrian Finns in Finland focused
not on historical atonement, but rather on religious identity as an indicator of belonging and
sameness with the broader Finnish national community. Over the period of Ingrian Finnish
migration to Finland, Finnish politicians did not re-address their arguments about Ingrian Finns
shared religious identity with Finland. Instead, religion effectively disappears from the Finnish
political discourse on Ingrian Finns by the mid 1990s, despite it being a distinct argument for
Ingrian Finns’ Finnish ethnic identity in 1990. We have called this the ‘secularisation’ of
migration discourse. We use the scare quotes in full cognizance of the fact that secularisation
usually refers to long-term processes rather than agent-driven change. In the case of the
Ingrian Finns’ the secularisation played a strategic – if not necessarily conscious – function:
religion was separated from other identity discourses by its largely ‘cultural’ function, whereas
language, ancestry and history had more ‘primordial’ functions that allowed Finnish politicians
to dismiss Ingrian Finnish migrants’ integration capability in Finland. Essentially, had the
political discourse on Ingrian Finns continued to note their shared Lutheran identity with
Finland, it would have been more difficult to dismiss them as incapable of integration,
whereas the primordial resources enabled exactly that. All the other resources could be
flipped on their head, except Lutheranism.
The genealogy of the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return Law shows that in ethnically
homogeneous contexts, discursive negotiation of national identity triggered by immigration
becomes a case of defining who the immigrants are vis-à-vis the imagined majority
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community. When the discourse on what immigrants do or can do changes, the discourse on
who they are can gain  opposite  meaning from the original,  as  the role  of  language in  the
discussion on the Ingrian Finns’ integration capability shows. Paradoxically, the more
essentialised the migrants’ culture, the easier the discourse is to put into use for both ends.
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